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K E Y N O T E  A D D R E S S
Peter Berger
A Tour d’Horizon
In a global overview of the situation of religion in the world, let me first say
what I think is very important—that is, what the situation is not. Social scien-
tists, historians, and many theologians are still of the opinion that we live in an
age of secularity, that the big challenge to religion is secularism in one way or
another. There are some reasons for this notion. I, myself, along with most soci-
ologists dealing with religion, believed that this was in fact the case when I
started out my career, but I think it is fair to say that this theory has been mas-
sively falsified. We do not live in a secularized age. We live in an age, in most of
the world, which is passionately religious. The world is full of enormous explo-
sions of religious fervor, and I think it is fair to say that there is not a single
major religious tradition which has not had such explosions from within its
community. 
There are two most significant explosions of this sort, looking at it globally.
One, of course, is very much in the news because some of its aspects are very dis-
turbing. That is resurgent Islam. If you look at Islam worldwide, it would be a big
mistake to think of it simply as a terroristic, violent, anti-Western movement.
Most of the Islam resurgence is religious in character, doesn’t have a political
agenda. It has to do with huge numbers of people either continuing, or in many
cases, quite dramatically returning to a way of life which is marked by Islam.
That Islamic resurgence has an enormous geographical scope. 
The other major explosion is somewhat less known, and this is Evangelical
Protestantism, which is an enormously dynamic movement. Its most significant
component is Pentecostalism. Our research institute at Boston University did
original pioneering research on this phenomenon 20 years ago. We started out
with Latin America, the principal investigator being a British sociologist, David
Martin, who has written a number of books since then. He now estimates that
there are at least 250 million Pentecostals in the world. 
Now, the general statement I made is that the world today is not secularized,
most of it; it is passionately religious. There are two big exceptions to this state-
ment. One is geographical; the other is sociological. The geographical exception
is Central and Western Europe. When you get to Eastern Europe, you have a dif-
ferent ballgame. What I say doesn’t apply to say, Russia. But Western and Central
Europe, what used to be the world of Latin Christianity, is highly secularized. 
Like every phenomenon, when you look at it more carefully, it becomes more
complicated. Europe is not quite as secular as it first seems, but certainly com-
pared to most of the world and certainly compared to the United States, Europe
is exceptional. The other exception is not geographical, but sociological. There is
indeed a rather thin but very influential class of people internationally, broadly
speaking, a sort of intelligentsia, which is indeed secularized. What has been
called a culture war in the United States is a very clear expression of this. We
now know from lots of polling data that the single most important factor of
whether people vote Republican or Democrat in the United States is how reli-
gious they are. This goes across all religious groups, more important than class,
race, sex, or age.
Similar fights between a secularizing intelligentsia, cultural elite, and reli-
gious populations occur elsewhere. Turkey is a very good example, India is a very
good example, and Israel is a very good example. In each of these cases you have
a state which was established by a very secular elite. In the case of Turkey, mili-
tantly so; in the case of India, less militant; Israel, less militant, but still very
secular. Zionism used to be a secular nationalistic project, and increasingly this
elite which set up the state is in conflict with a religious population which really
has different visions of what the society should be like. 
Let me make another very basic and important point. I made the point that
modernity does not necessarily lead to secularization, to a decline of religion. It
doesn’t, and the United States is one of the chief examples of this. What I think
modernity pretty much necessarily leads to is pluralism, which is a different
story. What do we mean by pluralism? Well, very simply, it means that people live
in social situations in which they have to rub elbows with lots of other people
with different world views, values, belief systems, moralities, etc. That has an
enormous effect. Modernity means massive migration of people, including
travel, tourism, but also permanent migration of millions of people who then
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suddenly find themselves in new situations with which they interact. Through
most of human history, people lived in social contexts in which there was not
total, but very strong consensus on basic questions of “What is the world like?
How should we live? What is good and evil?” etc. And, “To what gods should we
pray?” That kind of consensus is broken down by modernization. Instead, you
have a competition between different religious, moral, lifestyle views. 
Now, what are the consequences of pluralism? The institutional conse-
quence is quite simply that a market of religious options appears. Churches and
other religious institutions lose the monopoly status that they used to have.
What it means on the personal level is in some ways even more interesting; you
could say the market becomes internalized. Individuals, even those who are not
particularly given to philosophical reflection, are forced to choose between the
various religious options that are available to them in this market situation. 
This can be very uncomfortable to many people, and uncomfortable to me.
The reaction against this is militant reaffirmation of a particular alleged truth.
That is essentially fundamentalism. It is a term I am not very happy with. It
seems to me that we should call fundamentalism a reaction against relativiza-
tion, which is a very different thing from tradition. When you have traditional
religiosity, religion is taken for granted. This is very difficult now, and when you
want to reaffirm a traditional truth, when you become neotraditionalist, the
whole thing becomes a much more fragile and almost inevitably intolerant thing.
The “Other,” who doesn’t agree with you in the traditional situation, is not a
threat. It’s like if someone in this room said that the Earth was flat—we wouldn’t
be threatened by this. 
There are two forms of the fundamentalist project. Both are difficult under
modern conditions. One is more ambitious, which is to transform the entire soci-
ety in such a way that one can again be certain about basic truths. That, if you
will, is a totalitarian project, and very hard to do under modern conditions. 
The more modest fundamentalist project, which is a little more realizable,
is, if you will, the sectarian version, where you let the society as a whole go to
hell in a wheelbarrow, but you create a subculture, a sect, an enclave within the
society, and in that enclave you create a taken-for-granted religious world. 
I have to say some things about future prospects. I am nervous about pre-
dicting things that may happen next year. I sometimes wonder, had a sociologist
equipped with all the paraphernalia of modern research been transported back
in time to the early 16th century and hung around Germany and other parts of
Europe, would this person have predicted the Reformation? I think not. It hap-
pened in ways that would have been very hard to find. 
Let me make a few hesitant generalizations. The most important is that in
all likelihood, the overall situation that I have described—that is, most of the
world being very religious, a few places less religious—I don’t think this would be
reversed. I see no signs, for example, that the United States is becoming less reli-
gious. I see no signs that Europe is becoming much more religious, and the same
is true elsewhere. Sure, some things are unpredictable, but I don’t see a reason
for thinking there will be very dramatic changes in the near future. 
The demographic situation today gives us a pretty good idea of at least what
it’s going to be like 30 years from now. We know very clearly that there is a big
shift going on between the developed and developing world. In Europe, the shift
is dramatic: declining birthrates coupled with longer life expectancy, and when
you look at that trajectory down the road, it is very troubling. In the meantime,
in the developing world, you have this enormous population explosion, which
will be eventually reversed, but in the meantime the difference is going to be
very big indeed. Philip Jenkins has written eloquently about this. Some of you
will have read his book The Next Christendom. He makes the obvious case that
the future of Christianity doesn’t lie in the north, it lies in the south, globally
speaking. Increasingly, what is vital about Christianity is not coming out of the
enlightened milieus of Europe and North America. If you take the Catholic case,
the very things that Catholic intellectuals in Boston or in Amsterdam find trou-
bling about the Pope, the present one or his predecessor, is what delights people
in Africa or in Latin America or in the Philippines. 
Recently, a very interesting article was published in Foreign Policy by Philip
Longman. He says that the relative demography of religious and secular popula-
tions is also changing. American Judaism is a very interesting case of this.
Secular Jews have low birthrates like secular Episcopalians or any other upper-
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middle-class group. Orthodox Jews have a lot of kids. Some sociologists dealing
with American Judaism have said that 50 years from now, the great majority of
American Jews will be orthodox. 
On the future of Islam, I suspect that outside, nonreligious factors are going to
be very crucial as to what happens there. It will make an enormous difference
whether what we would call moderate Islam gets stronger and has a foothold in a
number of strategic countries, especially in the Middle East, which will encourage
this development in other parts of the Muslim world. It is unfortunate to have to
think in those terms, but I think it will be more decided by weapons in Iraq than by
the work of philosophers at various universities. 
The future of Evangelical Protestantism, the other big explosion that I have
mentioned, certainly is going to continue in Latin America. It is unlikely to become
much bigger, but it is huge already. Very much will depend on China: how is China
going to go on policies vis-à-vis religion? If the government, as apparently it
already has started to do, is more tolerant of Christianity, including Evangelical
Christianity, chances are we may see an explosion of Christianity in China, not too
dissimilar to what has happened in Latin America, which again will make a very
big difference, given the almost inevitable future of China as a great power. 
The most important thing that is happening in Europe, as far as religion is
concerned, is the challenge of Islam. There are now maybe some 15–20 million
Muslims within the European Union, many of them—I’m not talking just about the
radicals—are unwilling to play by the old European rule, which means complete reli-
gious freedom, but keep it private. That is very hard for Muslims to take. How
Europe will respond to this challenge is going to be extremely interesting. One pos-
sibility, as certainly the present Pope is counting on, is a revitalization of
Christianity, and a thinking back again on the Christian roots of so-called
European values. I don’t know whether this is going to happen, but it is a
possibility. 
In the United States, as long as present demographic trends continue, the
United States is going to be more religious, not less. While each one of these topics
one could talk about for hours, let me make one fairly certain prediction. Religion
will continue to be a centrally important factor on the world’s scene.
S E S S I O N  O N E
Charles Harper
The Great Dilemma: Science, Religion, and the Human Future
I want to talk about something called the “dilemma of power.” So what is
this dilemma of power? It starts with a bumper sticker. I would define it as fol-
lows. The dilemma of power is the fact that science and technology create new
forms of power rapidly, whereas cultures and civilizations do not so easily create
the parallel capacities of stewardship required to utilize newly created powers
for benevolent use and to restrain them from being used to serve malevolent
ends. 
Let’s go to the start of universities. Roger Bacon’s most famous discovery as
a scientist was the recipe by which “the sound of thunder may be artificially
reproduced by natural causes.” He had been researching Arabic texts, and he
came upon a recipe for exploding powder, which may have come from China. He
said, “a little [of this powder], fitted to the quantity of a thumb, makes a horrible
noise and wonderful lightening [here is the key], whereby any city and army may
be destroyed.” So here is a scientist, an early university leader, in the very first
century of the rise of the great universities in the West, and he makes this amaz-
ing discovery which had not been used for military purposes previously. Now,
within a hundred years, cannons are used in fixed emplacements throughout
Europe. A hundred years later, in 1449, in the Battle of Formigny in Normandy, I
believe it is correct that gunpowder is used in mobile cannons for the first vic-
tory of the French against the English. Within four years of that time, this new
technology transforms the politics of Europe. 
Fritz Haber, a chemist, won the Nobel Prize in 1919. In 1909, he made this
great discovery in Germany. This is his first experimental apparatus for the mak-
ing of ammonia from air, basically from nitrogen in the atmosphere.  Just within
the space of a few years from this scientific discovery by a chemist, the world
was transformed. The most spectacular use of this discovery from Fritz Haber
was fertilizer: cheap, easy, manufacturable fertilizer. Today, about 50 percent of
the food we eat is due to this discovery of Haber’s.
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Now, when ammonia was mass-produced in Germany, it had two uses. The
fertilizer was very important, but it was used for war immediately. Dresden after
World War II—all of that explosive power was due to this development of Haber’s
method of manufacturing ammonium nitrate for explosives. He wrote, “The
great technical accomplishments that the past 50 years have granted us, when
controlled by primitive egoists, are like fire in the hands of small children.” This
is an example in the life of one great scientist, like Einstein, of the dilemma of
power. 
The spirit of innovation cannot be stamped out, nor should it. But it can be
directed and controlled by equally powerful human impulses of responsibility
and love. Humanity cannot unlearn nuclear fission, for instance, but it can con-
trol the use of the world’s uranium. Nor is technology by itself usually the
answer to humanity’s most vexing dilemmas. 
What makes the quality of a great leader like Lincoln, who sought to incul-
cate in American history and consciousness the golden rule and sought to take
the abolitionist movement across the Atlantic, even though it was at great mas-
sive cost of countrywide warfare? The assertion that I’d like to put before you is
an unpopular assertion, that you typically won’t hear in the universities, that
there is a thing that you could call spiritual progress. It can be in a culture; it can
be in history; it can be in the life and soul of an individual. Associated with the
transformation of the outside can be a transformation of the inside and of cul-
ture, of the development of the so-called bourgeois virtues of hard work, or disci-
pline, of future-mindedness, and so forth.
The continued success and advance of science and of technology will con-
tinue to drop into the laps of humanity vast and unbelievable expanding powers.
The question is: What will be done with those powers? What is the quality of
stewardship that will be developed? Again, the three points: it is a big deal, this
dilemma of power; it comes out of the heart of what the modern world is; looking
at it makes us think about human transformation on the other side, apart from
science and technology; and the generic neglect of issues like spiritual progress
in the culture of the universities is tragic, as is the reflexive warfare-like dialec-
tic, which many people believe is intrinsic between science and religion. 
S E S S I O N  T W O
Where Is Religion Going?
Presider: Walter Connor
What are the implications of demographic changes that are projected to take place in the
next 50–100 years? For example, if Catholicism continues to shrink in Europe and expand
in Africa and Latin America, what consequences might result? And if evangelical or
Pentecostal faiths continue to outpace all other Christian denominations, what follows?
What about demographic trends and their consequences within non-Christian religions:
within Islam, Judaism, Buddhism, Hinduism, and others? What will be the effect of Islamic
and other diasporas upon religions, beliefs, and actions? In 2100 will the main world reli-
gions be different from those we have today? Or will they be the same religions, but
changed in content or in form? Or will they change in fervor? Might the election of Pope
Benedict, for example, as Jane Kramer reported from Rome at the time, lead to a
Catholicism “smaller but purer”?
The church—whichever church it might be—often has been viewed, as in the France of 1789,
as a reactionary force. But in North America, in the 1930s Reinhold Niebuhr showed its pos-
sibilities for progressive thought; and in South America several decades later “Liberation
Theology” espoused radicalism and reached out to the underclass. In discussing politics, is
it useful to distinguish between a religion and its church?
Phillips Talbot
South Asia Hindus and Buddhists
At the request of Ralph Buultjens, who recognizes that Buddhism originated
in India, I am starting with South Asia in order to get our history straight. Asia
is different from those lands peopled mainly by the children of Abraham. As per-
vading religions have no monotheistic overlay, they don’t have an international
structure to speak of, they don’t have particular sacred books, like the Hebrew
Bible or the New Testament or the Koran. They have instead a body of works in
Hinduism that have shaped history from a time in the early Brahmanism into
the modern period. From those works, people get their philosophic and their cul-
tural foundation for their religious life. 
Some 2,500 years ago, Buddhism evolved in India from protests against the
rigidities of Brahmanism, and it grew to produce some extraordinary dynasties
and empires, particularly the Maurya Empire with that great emperor Ashoka,
and it spread. It spread first in India, then beyond India, south and east through
Sri Lanka, Burma, and Southeast Asia, in its so-called “lesser vessel form,”
Theravada. Theravada Buddhism has characterized that part of Asia in the suc-
ceeding centuries, and has also spread north and east through central Asia and
into China and Korea and Japan in its Mahayana, “greater vessel form.” In India,
Session Two
931819_PARDEE_06  6/23/08  10:21 AM  Page 12
THE ROLE OF REL IG ION 
in the Longer-Range Future
1514
it was suppressed and disappeared under a revival of Hinduism many centuries
ago. Today, one can find in India a few clusters of Buddhists in the Himalayan
hill states. 
Since the partition of India and the end of British rule in 1947, when the
Muslim majority areas of the country went to Pakistan and what later became
Bangladesh, India has been peopled about 80 percent by Hindus. As in our soci-
ety, public life is penetrated by Muslims and Christians and Sikhs. India now has
a Muslim president, a Sikh prime minister, and an infrastructure that is essen-
tially Hindu. If you ask an Indian what is his faith base, he would no doubt say
Hindu. But in fact, in his life, the more central identities are more likely to be
based on various other categories: region, to start with, where he comes from,
and the languages, linguistic areas. Many Hindus would say that everyone born
in India is a Hindu on the grounds that 90 percent of those who call themselves
Muslims or Christians are the products of converts, whether forceful or other-
wise, from Hinduism and should be drawn back into the Hindu fold.  
Through history, India has had a very strongly stable social structure. In
recent generations, the changes have come increasingly fast and furious with
modernization, with urbanization, and in the past 50 years, particularly with
democratization. Democracy has produced a political system of organizing vot-
ers based largely upon these particular social groups. The national party that led
India to independence, the Congress Party, has found that it can no longer com-
mand a majority in the country. The Hindutva opposition has found that it can-
not command a majority in the country, and so India has become a country of
coalitions.  Governments nowadays in India are likely to have more than 20 par-
ties in them, and the resulting efforts to balance interests have been extraordi-
nary. One particular feature of democratization has been the rise of the lower
castes and the Dalits in political life, and therefore in public life because they are
more numerous. 
Where is all this going? It is hard to predict the future anywhere, and in
India it is particularly hard because India is in the throes of the most rapid
social transformation it has seen in our time. India also has about a third of its
population under age 25. It is clear that Hindutva, the idea of “Hinduness,” will
continue to be a significant element. It is also clear that these more limiting
social groupings will continue to have their power. Temples being built in cities
in this country and in Europe are drawing those from outside the Indian tradi-
tion into the Hindu tradition. I think that the projection of religious life can
safely be predicted for years ahead.
Ralph Buultjens
East Asia Hindus and Buddhists
The title of our panel is “Where Is Religion Going?” As we look forward, we
also look backward. The bare bones of my presentation are these: first, a form of
South Asian religion, Mahayana Buddhism, spread to East Asia. Second, it
spread to East Asia because it adapted, evolved, and intertwined with local
faiths. Third, in this process, it acquired an influence in society, but also
acquired a certain caution in dealing with local authorities and power centers.
Fourth, the emergence of a new East Asia in recent times has provided an oppor-
tunity for Mahayana Buddhism to become more assertive and to seek greater
influence in social and political affairs, so that finally in the future we can
expect a more assertive role for this form of religion.
My mandate has to do with East Asia, and that is actually to deal with
Buddhism, because there is very little Hinduism in the areas east of Indonesia
and Central Asia. Buddhism is a missionary religion, somewhat like Islam and
Christianity, somewhat unlike traditional Hinduism and Judaism. Between about
200 BC and 600 AD, it spread to East Asia over the central Asian highlands and
along the Silk Route. So Buddhism came to East Asia as an outside religion,
seeking to penetrate society, which already had some native belief systems well
developed—Confucianism with its ethical and spiritual structures, Shintoism,
certain folk faiths, animistic spirit worship, ancestor reverence—that existed in a
fairly organized form in these lands that Buddhism was coming into. The local
faiths were also strongly supported by the state in China, in Japan, in Korea, and
by the tribal chiefs and shamans of Central Asia. In these environments, the
Buddhism of India traveling into these areas lost many of the features of the
original Buddhism. The rather austere, doctrinally strict, monastically organ-
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ized, clerically celibate religion of original Theravada Buddhism was unlikely to
be accepted by the political power holders and the ordinary people in these new
countries. 
And so another type of Buddhism, Mahayana Buddhism, evolved in East
Asia, less strictly monastic, less demanding of its clergy, more demotic in its
message and language, and somewhat more colorful and showy in its practice. It
provided a large view of the universe, of the human place in the cosmos, and it
offered a way of individual redemption by good works and improvement of the
community as a whole. It did not tie individual destiny to the family, to the
ancestors, or to the shamans. Mahayana Buddhism, in order to advance, also
became extremely cautious politically, generally supporting the local establish-
ment. There is quite a contrast with the often confrontational role that Hinduism
and Buddhism have played in South Asia. 
Their cues of adaptation and survival, whatever one’s view of their docile
character, have enabled Mahayana Buddhism to endure. They have enabled it to
face the two great challenges of modernization that religions in developing coun-
tries have had to contend with: organization and technology. In recent years,
Hinduism, Theravada Buddhism of South Asia, Christianity, and Islam in Asia
have been very disturbed and often become very fearful at modernization. Their
resentments lead to anger, violence, disruption, and so on. But Mahayana
Buddhism, seeping into East Asia, has managed to accommodate modernization
and regain its influence in societies such as Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and
even Hong Kong. 
Now, after 50 years, another new Asia is emerging. China goes capitalist;
Hong Kong goes to China; Japan is losing its place as number one; South Korea
has democratized; Taiwan has democratized. And there are some signals that
Mahayana Buddhism may also be changing its approach, may be in the process
of becoming less quiescent and finding a political and social role with greater
assertiveness. In the next decade or so, as China grapples with the problems of
globalization and fraying authoritarianism, Mahayana Buddhism could provide
an ideology of change for a society that is in a rather fragile state. 
In addition, the East Asian population is going through a big transforma-
tion. It is an aging population mix. Population growth in East Asia is now one-
half of one percent a year, and declining. The number of young people below 15
years of age is one of the lowest in the world, equal to Europe and America, far
less than any other developing region. This may see all the people looking to tra-
ditional religions to offset the social deracination in society. 
Jane Kramer
Catholics: The New Papacy
Is this new papacy going to opt for a purer, smaller church, or is it simply, as
it always has been, in the business of competing for truths in a world of prefer-
ences, as Peter Berger said? The church is a business and, like all businesses,
prefers to be bigger and if possible purer rather than smaller and purer. 
The question of who Joseph Cardinal Ratzinger is really is quite important.
It raises several questions. The first has to do with understanding his role for
nearly a quarter of a century as prefect of the Congregation for the Doctrine of
the Faith, or to most of us, Grand Inquisitor. The Church had spectacularly shut
its doors to reform during Ratzinger’s years as prefect, and during the 10 years
of John Paul’s very long illness, Ratzinger was in fact the most powerful man in
the Vatican, and in some ways the ultimate authority in the Vatican. 
The Jesuits lost their independence, their Vicar General Designate was
removed, their order was placed under strict Vatican control, their schools and
seminaries and missions were left to founder, a decline more or less officially
attributed to no takers, but in fact a direct result of the lack of Vatican impri-
matur and Vatican cash. The Vatican’s new preferred order became Opus Dei. A
third of the money in private trust in Spain is deeded to Opus Dei, and figures
are similar in a great deal of South America. It was given virtual control of the
finances of the Vatican Bank. In a sense, it bailed out the Vatican Bank after the
banking scandals in Italy. The liberation theologians like Gutierrez and Boff
were called to Rome and silenced as Marxists, although having worked with
some of them I would say you could more accurately call them Christian commu-
nitarian evangelists. I could go on and on, but you could call Ratzinger’s first 10
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years as Inquisitor an old-fashioned purge of the church’s troops. I would say
that the next 10 years will probably be devoted to purging its teachings of ambi-
guity and even of interpretive challenge. Benedict XVI spoke about the “waves
battering at the ship of true faith.” Here are some of the waves I counted: global-
ism, feminism (that lost me), individualism, desire, homosexuality, demands for
the ordination of women, mysticism, sects, Turkish Muslims in Christian
Europe, etc. 
The second question raised by Benedict’s papacy, just entering his second
year, is whether his particular kind of Catholic leadership will stay the course
against all the other fundamentalisms assailing it. He may have to settle for a
smaller, purer church, but keeping in mind the spread of Islam, he may be look-
ing at, if not banking on, a larger, purer one. In this country, he has thrown his
support behind not just Opus Dei, but other orthodox Catholic lay orders and
their priests. The Legionaries of Christ are a good example. They are recruiting
successfully, and not just among the Latino and Asian immigrants who had been
slipping away to the Protestant sects, but also in the private schools and colleges
of our big cities. This, I think, is one of the things we should be talking about
today when we talk about the church.
Christopher Marsh
Orthodox Christianity
To follow up a paper on the papacy, we look at the other side: Constantinople
and the Orthodox world as it is today and in the future. Will we still see an
Orthodox Church in the world 50 to 100 to 300 years in the future? 
The Orthodox Church traces its roots back to the earliest churches estab-
lished by the apostles, and it remained a part of the United Church until the
Great Schism of 1054, at which point Christendom broke down into the eastern
and western halves. The concept of ecclesiastical economy is central to ortho-
doxy, and though the church is very hierarchical, it was originally centered
around the great churches of Constantinople, Alexandria, Antioch, and
Jerusalem: Moscow later achieving patriarchal status in 1589 and hence becom-
ing the third Rome.
Today, the Orthodox Church is spread across the globe, from the Balkans in
Eastern Europe, throughout Eurasia, and in Ethiopia, with pockets elsewhere.
Two hundred fifteen million Orthodox Christians live in approximately 133 coun-
tries.  The largest populations of Orthodox Christians reside in Russia, with 
80 million; Ukraine, with 27 million; Ethiopia, with 22 million; Romania, with 
19 million; and Greece, with 15 million. The US is home to somewhere between 
2 million and 5 million Orthodox, so while the Orthodox Church in America is
not a huge player, it is still a significant force. 
Since 1992, the number of Orthodox churches in Russia has more than dou-
bled. Monasteries have been restored, new ones established, and even Orthodox
colleges are becoming a popular facet of the Russian higher education land-
scape. Similar trends are under way in many other Orthodox countries in
Eastern Europe and the Balkans, even in places like Macedonia and the
Transdnistria region. However, since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the
Russian population has decreased from 149 million to 141 million, a decrease of
8 million people. It is projected that it might decrease all the way to about 132
million within the next 10–15 years if this decline continues along the same path.
With such a population crisis, the Orthodox world is likely to remain as much of
a marginal player in global Christianity in the next Christendom as it was in the
previous millennium. 
The Orthodox tradition has several challenges that it must face in order to
come to terms with modernity and before it can compete effectively with other
religions in the marketplace. In Russia, for example, the church is still using the
Old Church Slavonic, into which the liturgy was translated more than a thousand
years ago and is not understood by the average Russian. A priest in Moscow got
into a lot of trouble a few years ago by translating parts of the liturgy into mod-
ern Russian. Also, Orthodoxy has not been personalized to the extent that most
forms of Christianity have, which is a major market advantage of religion in
today’s world. In Orthodoxy, the point is to keep things as traditional as possible.
Therefore, innovation is something that is stifled.
In today’s Russia, Orthodoxy has become such a central facet of the culture
once again, that to be Russian means to be Orthodox.  To not be Orthodox while
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being ethnically Russian makes one suspect. In fact, Deputy Prime Minister
Ivanov is known to actually have members of his staff baptized by picking up the
telephone and calling a priest so he can baptize a person before he appoints the
person to any position. He will not work with anyone who is not a member of the
church. 
There is a remote possibility that Orthodoxy will not be able to compete
effectively against the great proselytizing religions, but I think the chances of
this are slim. In other words, will Orthodoxy go away and will Protestantism/
Catholicism/Judaism/Islam take over the souls that Orthodoxy has served thus
far? I think Orthodoxy is likely to be around for a long time. Despite the preferen-
tial treatment these states give to Orthodoxy, it is still something that is so
deeply embedded in the culture, and the other religious traditions are seen as
being alien to those cultures. Most of history is about slow evolution and rare
episodes of dramatic change. This is one reason why we should bet on Orthodox
Christianity being around long into the future. Another perhaps even more com-
pelling reason is that despite the greatest efforts of popes, czars, and commis-
sars, including the almost complete obliteration of the Orthodox Church in
Russia during the Communist era when religion was listed in the party program
as a vice alongside alcoholism, it has shown its ability to rejuvenate itself and,
like mushrooms after a rain, to emerge from seeming invisibility.
Michael Smith
Niebuhr Protestantism
What is Niebuhrian Protestantism, and what are its future prospects?
Reinhold Niebuhr believed that human beings are creatures of God created in
God’s image, but they are also, and always, creatures capable of sinning, even in
their highest achievements. There is always a measure of ambiguity in every-
thing we do. “We are an organic unity,” he says, “of creature and spirit, and all of
our cultural and intellectual pursuits therefore become infected with the sin of
pride.”
Now note that this dual nature allows Niebuhr to argue that we are capable
of engaging with the world, and indeed he regards it as the mission of the church
to engage as a prophetic minority with the broader culture. “Indeed,” he says, “it
is our duty to do so.” Because if we don’t do it, we leave it to all these other influ-
ences, these secular influences, in particular, that don’t understand in a sense
the levels of good that we may achieve, but at the same time the inevitably
tainted character of all our achievements. He says, “We must strive for justice,
and paradoxically by realizing we can never fully achieve it, we come closer to
doing so. We are most free when we recognize the limits of our freedom.” Now,
when one comes to collective life, this task is more difficult because states are, in
effect, bundles of justified self-righteousness. 
Our individual will to power and our pride, a constant danger for our indi-
vidual salvation, are, in a sense, magnified in a collective setting. We become
enthralled with the notion that we are part of a sort of nationally sanctified mis-
sion. He thought we Americans were particularly prone to this because we grew
up in an illusion of innocence, and then we often swung to what he called “ado-
lescent pride of power.” He believed it was the task of what he called a “prophetic
minority” not to join in the celebration, but rather to offer a corrective to the
“national sin of self-righteousness...If we fall into this error, the natural resent-
ments against our power on the part of the weaker nations would be com-
pounded with resentments against our pretensions of superior virtue.” 
One of my favorite quotations from Niebuhr is this one he wrote in an essay
on the eve of World War II on why the Christian faith is not pacifist. He said,
“The Christian faith ought to persuade us that political controversies are always
conflicts between sinners and not between righteous men and sinners. It ought
to mitigate the self-righteousness which is an inevitable concomitant of all
human conflict.” So all along you get a balanced message from Niebuhr.
Considering the future, I would say that Niebuhr’s strength never resulted
from the fact that he was the spokesman of a mainstream Protestant church—he
wasn’t. Are the conditions ripe for any kind of Niebuhr renaissance, as some
have been calling for? Well, we heard many times already today that the culture
is enormously different. But perhaps there is still some reason to hope that this
kind of nuanced, thoughtful, theologically rich message can still have some reso-
nance. It is not true that he is ignored on college campuses. He is taught exten-
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Jews living in Israel. The Orthodox dealt with this in two ways. You had some
wh0 simply rejected the authenticity or the relevance of this state, and you had
those who believed in a kind of instrumentalization of this state; that is to say
that the secular state was a phase in God’s plan, ultimately, to establish the king-
dom of God. So one could cooperate with the state, serve in the army, pay taxes,
and so forth because these institutions were just being used unwittingly by God
in furtherance of a grand plan. That had real messianic and utopian potential
that was unleashed in 1967 with the Israeli victory of that year and the conquest
of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. But that dream is now dead. With the emer-
gence of an Olmert Coalition, I think we can safely say that that sort of utopi-
anism is gone. 
What does that mean for the future? Here I would simply speculate that the
Orthodox will now channel their energies into pressing for a greater extension of
Jewish law, or Halakha, into matters of state, in particular domestic policy. 
Islam is a fast-growing religion and it’s fast-growing worldwide. It is also
growing in the United States as well, interestingly. I teach at Georgetown and I
see some of this there. I regularly take straw polls of my colleagues in other uni-
versities, and they report, probably as a feature of youthful rebellion, a great
interest in and conversion to Islam. Especially interesting is the appeal of Islam
to Hispanics in the United States. 
The striking thing in Islam now with implications for the future is a global-
ization of Muslim identity. A Pew poll in 2003 asked, “Do you feel more in com-
mon with Muslims elsewhere?” This question was asked in nine
Muslim-majority countries by the Pew pollsters, and in every country a majority
responded by agreeing either strongly or very strongly with the statement: “I feel
more in common with Muslims nowadays.” This has to do with, first of all, a
sense of crisis, generally, in the Muslim world, and the interpenetration of
modernity and tradition. 
It is in Europe where the two civilizations are really facing one another.
There are quite interesting developments in “cartoon-gate,” the Danish cartoons
that interestingly caused no riots in Europe, but many in the Middle East and
elsewhere, showing the umbilical connection that still remains between those
sively all over the place, and not only in religious studies courses, but also in
international relations, ethics classes, and so on because of his applied
character. 
Ultimately, Niebuhr had a great deal of faith in the ultimate message of his
version of Christianity. “The Christian faith,” he says, “in its profoundest
insights, sees the whole of human history as involved in guilt and finds no
release from guilt except in the grace of God. The Christian is freed by that grace
to act in history, to give his devotion to the highest values he knows, to defend
those citadels of civilization which necessity and historic destiny have made him
the defender. And he is persuaded by that grace to remember the ambiguity of
even his best actions. If the Providence of God does not enter the affairs of men
to bring good out of evil, the evil in our good may easily destroy our most ambi-
tious efforts and frustrate our highest hopes.” I will end by just citing that arti-
cle of Niebuhrian faith. 
Steven Simon
Muslims and Jews
I’m going to start with Jews for no other reason than order of revelation. The
future of the Jews is an interesting question because it raises a couple of other
ones, one of which is, what are Jews? The other question it raises is, supposing
(as is conceivable) that down the road there are no Jews, can you have Judaism
without Jews? The demographics don’t look really terribly good for Jews, at least
outside of Israel. I emphasize here that demography is not destiny. There are sur-
prises. No one would have guessed in the 1930s that one third of the world’s
Jewish population would be gone within a decade, in a kind of catastrophic
encounter with violence. Nor would anyone have guessed that 37 percent of the
world’s Jewish population would by the year 2000 be located in what was then
Palestine. That just would have been inconceivable. Demographic shifts can take
place even though we don’t anticipate them. What at this point is clear is that, at
least outside of Israel, Jews are experiencing a zero population growth. 
Peter Berger was, of course, right that Israel had a very self-consciously sec-
ular identity in its early years, which is not to say there weren’t a lot of Orthodox
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two areas. I’ll close by saying in this regard that the polling done of European
Muslim community leaders seems to suggest that they really want to play by
what Peter Berger called “the rules of the road,” that somehow they want to be
part of a developing Islam that is compatible with the way in which broader
European culture functions. The really interesting transformative developments
in Islam are happening on the periphery of the Muslim world.
S E S S I O N  T H R E E
What Can Religion Offer to the Modern World?
Presider: Joachim Maitre
How does the future of religion relate to the future of the economic order, the political
order, the regional or global order? What can religion contribute to human, social, and eco-
nomic development? Would this be in collaboration with science or in competition with it?
How can religion deal with change? How can it deal with new knowledge, new norms, new
information, and new and changing circumstances and conditions? With modernity itself?
On analysis, the clash of civilizations that Huntington famously forecast turns out to be
clashes of religion. Will we indeed experience religious wars in the far future? Or will the
causes divide between fighting religions and pacifist religions—or between liberal/moder-
ate faiths and fundamentalist ones? Was Huntington wrong to predict “cultural”/religious
wars rather than national or regional conflicts? And what about terrorism and/or revolu-
tionary movements in the Southern Hemisphere?
Benjamin Friedman
Religion and the Economic Order
The core hypothesis that I would like to advance is that religious thinking
influences economic thinking in important ways. At a certain level, this is a
familiar enough idea. Nonetheless, I think it is fair to say that over recent
decades, certainly the teaching and writing about economics has taken place in a
largely secular sphere. What I have in mind is that there is an influence of reli-
gion and religious thinking on economic thinking, and that normally we leave
this unstated. It is not just that we don’t talk about it; I think most people aren’t
even aware of it. 
The idea of a connection between economic progress and what we would
think of as political, social, moral progress goes back to Adam Smith. I don’t have
in mind Smith of either The Wealth of Nations or The Theory of Moral
Sentiments. This is Smith of the lectures on jurisprudence, in which Smith, inci-
dentally contemporaneously with Turgot in France, developed the idea that eco-
nomic progress went through four successive stages familiar to everyone today:
1) hunting and gathering, 2) pasturage, 3) settled agriculture and 4) commerce.
The core of the Smith idea in this respect was that each of these successive
advances in the economic mode of organization and production led necessarily
to changes in social arrangements and governance. The thinkings of the impor-
tant theologians were discussed in secular society in Smith’s youth: the progres-
sion from Mead, Burnett, Baxter, was taking place from the early 17th century
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right up into the early 18th century, and Smith wrote the theory that I have in
mind sometime in the 1750s. 
Let me now turn to the second of my examples. What are the prospects for
economic well-being in the world and for advance among countries? Will today’s
poor countries always be poor? Maybe some subgroup of them will and another
won’t. If so, why? Or will the world economic order be characterized by what
economists call “convergence”?
We now have lots of discussion in the economic development field of what
I’ll call “trap models,” of countries getting stuck. The essential feature in each
one of them is some kind of a circular, mutually enforcing interaction between
economic performance broadly construed and either political performance or
something else. The way economists would interpret all of these types of stories
is that they are ones in which there is a determinative role of what economists
call “initial conditions.” 
Churchill, giving his reaction to the fall of France, said, “It is inadmissible
for the destiny of a great people to be decided by the temporary deficiencies of
its technical apparatus.” Economists are traditionally so reluctant to entertain
views within which culture, specifically including religion, is an influence on
economic outcomes in this kind of sense. Culture is the one thing you can’t con-
trol. You can’t go in and change the culture, therefore it is inadmissible to say
that the outcome is being determined by the culture. At the same time, econo-
mists are very resistant to the line of thinking that has now become somewhat
famous called “path dependence.” In other words, you can’t go back down the
path from which you came. 
My point is that economists are very resistant to any notion that you can’t
get to a good outcome because of where you are now, because this flies in the
face of the possibility of salvation. For reasons that are religious rather than sec-
ular, even in the secular matters, I think there is an underlying religious founda-
tion. The conclusion I offer is that yes, religious thinking is going to be
important in determining actions that people take that will affect the economic
order, and this may take place in more visible, ordinary ways as well, but I think
the really interesting way in which it is going to take place and is now taking
place is at a level that is much deeper, more fundamental, and, alas, largely
invisible.
David Fromkin
Religion and the Political Order
The relationship between religion and politics is an absolutely enormous
subject. This will cover only a few points. First point: it is a field where it seems
to me especially important to keep clear the definitions of the terms that we use.
When we talk about religion, we sometimes mean an organization; we some-
times mean an institution; we sometimes mean a priesthood; we sometimes
mean a doctrine. Even in dealing with the doctrines of religion, one always has to
keep in mind that what people say they believe is not necessarily what they actu-
ally believe, even if they themselves believe that they believe it. 
Second point: the intimate relationship between religion and politics goes
back as far as we can see. The first civilization, the cities of the Sumerian plain,
developed various forms of political civilization, but amongst them, cities that
were dedicated to the gods—and not the whole pantheon—each to its own god.
That is as far back as we can go because it is as far back as we can read. Six
thousand years ago, there was a strong relationship between church and state. I
am going to use the term “state,” as I just have, as a kind of stand-in for “politics”
and “political.” 
We can see—and I’ll just give a few examples—the many forms in which reli-
gion and the state have intertwined over the years. Sometimes they have been
rivals, and sometimes partners. Sometimes religion has been on the side of the
poor and the dispossessed, but more often it has been on the side of the rich and
powerful, which is where the pay is better. Religion has used the state as when
Constantine and his successors, having converted to Christianity, used the state
to make, eventually, Christianity the state religion. But then it was the opposite,
upside-down with Alexander the Great and the great kings of Asia and the
pharaohs of Egypt. Those who used religion by proclaiming themselves gods
used religion in the service of politics.
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Looking ahead, there has been much mention of Samuel Huntington’s the-
ory that the wars of the future will not be so much wars amongst nation-states;
they will instead be wars among civilizations. One of the things that many of us
saw when the article first appeared in Foreign Affairs magazine was if you
looked at Samuel Huntington’s civilizations, they were religions. His real predic-
tion, therefore, was going to be that there were going to be wars among religions,
which the events since 9/11 seemed to many people to confirm. Without other
objections or qualifications to Professor Huntington’s theory, even if there are
wars among religions, there is something there, something deeper, something
below that that explains the conflict.
The problem that I see arising is that science and religion have a different
notion about belief. In religion, one has faith. But in science, truth is a different
kind of thing. To begin with, truth is provisional in science. Scientists believe
something until an experiment disproves it. It remains, therefore, very impor-
tant that we always get the balance right between our inquiry for one kind of
truth and our inquiry for the other. A balance is needed there.
Session Four
S E S S I O N  F O U R
Must We Choose Between Religion and Science? The Question
Revisited
Presider: Ray L. Hart
Can religion and science be reconciled? If so, on what basis? Is science a kind of religion? 
If scientific accounts of creation and of natural processes and of the nature of the universe
and of the nature of life and death are factual, then how can we categorize religious
accounts of these same matters? How should we hold both in our heads at the same time?
Can society afford to teach that creationism and evolution are of equal validity? If we
accept the methodology of science, then we agree that all truth is provisional, whereas reli-
gions by and large preach that their teachings and principles are absolutely true and eter-
nal: which is it to be? Can religion do for the modern world what science cannot—or visa
versa? 
Kirk Wegter-McNelly, Panelist
If human cultures are to realize their potential to activate the most life-sus-
taining of the possibilities present in their scientific and religious quests, then
an important shift needs to take place. The shift is from a mythical understand-
ing of the relation between science and religion in terms of conflict, to a mythi-
cal understanding of the relation between the two in terms of cooperation and
mutual benefit. Briefly, the Conflict Myth: to claim that there exists a mythologi-
cal understanding of the relation between science and religion in terms of con-
flict, is not to make the patently false claim that there has never been any
conflict between science and religion—of course there has. What I mean by the
Conflict Myth is that the notion of conflict has, in many parts of Western culture
at least, been elevated to the status of a metaphysical principle. Whether it is the
materialistic atheist or the religious fundamentalist, both share, participate in,
advance, and sustain this Conflict Myth.
I would like to offer six different strategies for overcoming the Conflict
Myth. 1) Expose the complexities of the historical relations between science and
religion. It is not simply the case that science came out of the cultural womb
armed for combat with religion, or that religion’s immediate response to the
advent of modern science was to adopt a defensive posture. The number of
devout fellows of the Royal Society in its early years gives the lie to this view, for
example, rather quickly. 
2) Document the various ways in which science and religion have been
related in the past and the present. Most famous in this regard is a fourfold
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typology developed by Ian Barber, a typology which has played an important role
in locating conflict as one of a number of different options for thinking about
the ways of relating science and religion. There are many different typologies.
There are critiques of Barber’s typology, but the typological exercise has been a
kind of important first step in the guild of which I am a member. Barber’s four-
fold typology, for those of you who don’t know it, is conflict, independence, dia-
logue, and integration, suggesting that conflict is one of several, but certainly
not the only option.
3) Register the complexities and limitations of the scientific method from a
philosophical perspective. When I do this in class, I often experience or sense
some hostility from students who have had significant scientific training in
their background. It takes me a little while to convince them that what I’m trying
to do is not to denigrate science, but to honor it, to honor the magnitude of its
achievements in light of the actual lived difficulty, the messiness, if you will, of
what it means to do science as a scientist. 
4) Embrace the temporal and hypothetical character of theology. This is both
a concession that theologies of the past have wrongly portrayed themselves, in
rather apodictic terms, and at the same time an affirmation that theology can
still play a vital role when done in a more hypothetical mode. This is not to elimi-
nate differences between science and religion, but to say that theology has some-
thing to learn from science’s willingness to live with uncertainty.
5) Rebuild the relation between religion and science. This can happen in two
different ways. There are those who are interested in this relationship, who are
interested in constructing new theories about how the two fields relate to one
another, both within academic circles, and then how they relate more broadly in
culture. This is in a sense the epistemological task. But there is also the interest-
ing and challenging task of relating specific religious traditions and religious
ideas, commitments, doctrines, to use language that has been introduced today,
to specific scientific developments. This is the substantive, the concrete dimen-
sion of the reconstructive effort. 
6) Promote scientific and religious literacy in our primary and secondary
educational systems. This means teaching science in ways that don’t simply set
science up as an endeavor in which you attempt to get the answer that you know
is already right. And the flip side of that, of course: to teach religion in ways that
transcend the ways that it has been taught in the past, to a kind of education
that acknowledges and values the multiplicity of religious traditions that make
up our post-Christendom, if not entirely secular, world.
Hans Kornberg, Panelist
E. coli are single-celled organisms which do everything, more or less, that
you and I do, except go to symposia and talk about it. They don’t have a nervous
system; they are not multi-cellular; as I said, they are single-celled. They can not
only be single-celled, but they can grow on one single type of carbon compound.
Give them glucose, a little bit of nitrogen, a touch of phosphate, and off they go.
They manifest their ambition, which is for one E. coli to become two E. coli, and
do it very quickly. They have a whole range of tastes, so they can grow on almost
anything. Thus, it is possible then to take the organisms and to follow the path
that any food material, single-carbon compound it uses to give rise to everything
that makes one E. coli become two E. coli: the proteins, the nucleic acids, and 
so on. 
Here, of course, I use the word “model system” because we know from chemi-
cal and biochemical studies that, as Jacques Monod once put it memorably,
“What happens in E. coli also probably happens in E-lefant.” There is a basic
unity to life processes which allows me, at least in the most simple so-called
housekeeping metabolism of the cell, to extrapolate from my E. coli to the ele-
phant, and to you and me as well, and I don’t have animal rights activists com-
plaining if I kill a few of them.
The argument that science and religion are in that sense antithetical is
somewhat specious. Of course, people who do not themselves understand this
rigid search for evidence that we can cling to and that we can attempt to refute,
sometimes advance fanciful explanations of things that they don’t understand,
forgetting that absence of evidence is not evidence of absence. There is always a
way in which one can try and test any explanation.  
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The name of the conference is “The Role of Religion in the Longer-Range
Future.” Clearly, this is not something which is of absolute priority as far as my
E. coli is concerned. This has colored all our presentations so far with a distinctly
anthropocentric tinge. I maintain that it is the essence of science not to be sub-
ject to this. The big difference between science and the philosophies that are not
science is that almost always science is directed outwards, whereas arts and
humanities are directed inwards to see how the world affects us. The kind of con-
clusions that we draw, what we regard as the structure on which now the applica-
tion of science is based, the technology that Charles Harper was talking about
this morning, is based on the recognition that there are patterns that are repro-
ducible—that are there in nature outside of our being there or not; that the tree
will make a noise in the forest whether we are there to hear it or not. And it is
this pattern that exists quite apart from us, which enables us then not only to
conclude to a very large extent what is happening and what has happened, but
also to predict what is likely to happen, which gives the impetus to the develop-
ments that we this morning saw chartered. 
My conclusion is that although it is true that scientific truth is provisional,
that doesn’t mean that it is relativistic. It means that it is the nearest approxima-
tion that we have to constructing a picture of the world in which we live that is
self-consistent and that enables us to predict what might happen with a fair
degree of confidence, and, what is more, to welcome any attempt to alter that
through evidence. Somebody once wrote that there is nothing more terrible than
a beautiful idea slain by an ugly fact. I would put that the other way around. I
would say that there is nothing more beautiful than to see a theory or hypothesis
falsified by a fact which can be repeated and which can be established. It is only
when the dust settles, as one of my teachers put it, that you know whether you
have been riding a horse or an ass.
Owen Gingerich, Panelist
“Can society afford to teach that creationism and evolution are of equal
validity?” The whole business of evolution has been very controversial in
America during the entire 20th century and carrying on now. After the Scopes
trial, evolution essentially disappeared from the textbooks. It wasn’t until the
Sputnik era that biologists realized that there were great things missing from
these textbooks, and a great revision was attempted with a national program to
get funding to revise the biology textbooks. The most interesting consequence of
this was that Congress voted to cut off funding for any national education pro-
grams in the sciences because this was seen as too controversial. 
When creationism as a subject to be taught in the schools was squashed by
the famous Little Rock trial, there was a kind of a regrouping. Nowadays we find
a great controversy over what is called Intelligent Design. Many scientists feel
that in fact Intelligent Design is simply creationism in disguise, and I suspect
that many people who are hoping that their school boards will put Intelligent
Design into biology classrooms may feel that is the case. The reality is that the
Intelligent Design theorists almost universally accept a very long age of the
Earth. Most of them accept quite a bit of the evolutionary picture, but they feel
that there is an intelligent input into this process. I suspect that there is a con-
siderable knee-jerk reaction on the part of both scientists and many people who
are trying to get Intelligent Design into the schools not really understanding
what’s going on there. 
Can society afford to teach that creationism and evolution are of equal valid-
ity? Obviously not creationism; I would substitute here Intelligent Design, and
they are not equal because they are in different categories. I think somehow we
are going to have to in the future begin to appreciate this fact considerably more
for our society to cope with this. Many scientists, I suppose, would feel that they
are totally uninterested in metaphysics. Remember, “meta” means beyond; it is
“beyond physics,” and these are basic ideas one has in which one frames the sci-
ence or a great deal of one’s attitudes about things. 
George Whitesides, who is a university professor at Harvard and had been
chairman of the chemistry department, wrote a very interesting preface for a
book which is being published now by Cambridge University Press. He says in
that introduction that the great mystery of mysteries of science is in fact the ori-
gin of life. He says he cannot imagine how it happened. There is no clue about it,
but as a scientist, he is absolutely sure that eventually science will come to terms
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with this and figure out how it was done. I cannot help but think what an inter-
esting leap of faith and what an interesting metaphysical position to have
adopted in this respect. I think all scientists have a metaphysical view of the
world, whether they are prepared to be explicit about it or not. 
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